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Abstract 
The right way to measure the degree and extent of the different aspects of fiscal 
decentralization has been a long-debated, yet underdeveloped issue. There has been little 
consensus on the right approach to developing a single indicator which is sometimes needed 
to show a general trend in fiscal decentralization and reveal relationship to other variables in 
empirical studies. In particular, several composite indicators of fiscal decentralization have 
been proposed, but there are very few attempts to evaluate and compare these measures in 
terms of implicit biases and different weights between revenue and expenditure 
decentralization. Critically reviewing and comparing various types of fiscal-relation 
indicators in a systematic way, this paper proposes two criteria to classify similar-looking 
composite indicators for fiscal decentralization while it also presents two new composite 
measures. The new fiscal decentralization indicators are symmetric in terms of the relative 
effects of revenue and expenditure decentralization on the value of the composite indicators 
at the same time that they are weighted for/against fiscal gaps and imbalances. It is argued 
that different composite indicators reflect different perspectives on which aspect of fiscal 
decentralization is more important and whether a growing fiscal gap means less fiscal 
decentralization or not.  
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I. Introduction 
 
A vast literature and national accounts data show that there is a general trend 
throughout OECD countries regardless of whether the country is federal or unitary to 
increasingly devolve the responsibility for key public sector functions from the central 
government to subnational tiers of government. Still, the “right” way to measure the degree 
and extent of the different aspects of the fiscal decentralization has been a long-debated, yet 
underdeveloped issue in theoretical research and more recently, in empirical works which try 
to investigate the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, fiscal performance, 
and other important economic outcomes.2 Unfortunately, the sacrifice of rigour for 
tractability has seriously harmed the quality of public policy debate on the issue (Sharma, 
2011). Furthermore, there has been little consensus on the right approach to developing a 
single indicator which is sometimes needed to show a general trend in fiscal decentralization 
and reveal relationship to other variables in empirical studies. In particular, several composite 
indicators of fiscal decentralization have been proposed, but there are very few attempts to 
evaluate and compare these measures in terms of implicit biases and different weights 
between revenue and expenditure decentralization. The reason being is that we do not have a 
clear criterion by which these composite measures can be judged in a consistent way. 
Critically reviewing and comparing various types of fiscal-relation indicators in a systematic 
way, this paper proposes two criteria to classify similar-looking composite indicators for 
fiscal decentralization while it also presents two new composite measures. The new 
indicators are symmetric in terms of the relative effects of revenue and expenditure 
decentralization on the value of the composite indicators at the same time that they are 
weighted for/against fiscal gaps and imbalances.  
2 Dziobek et al. (2011) provides a good example of the challenge in measuring decentralization. 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section II examines typical measures for fiscal 
relations involving decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance on the same base before we 
focus on the composite indicators for fiscal decentralization to expose their implicit biases 
and limitations. Section III develops two new composite measures which are designed to 
overcome the shortcomings of the previous composite indicators. Section IV presents a 
summary and some conclusions for theoretical and empirical work concerning fiscal 
decentralization.     
 
 
II. Decentralization Indicators and their Limitations 
 
 Fiscal decentralization is referred to as the multi-faceted multi-dimensional process 
of central government’s (CG) transferring decision-making powers concerning public finance 
to subnational government (SNG), covering both expenditure and revenue sides of 
decentralization. For practice purposes, however, there has been diversity of approaches to 
measuring fiscal decentralization. To facilitate the comparison and discussion of the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of various decentralization indicators, we utilize a two-
dimensional representation, that is, the composition of revenue and expenditure in the general 
government (GG) level because decentralization may involve both expenditure and revenues 
as SNG’s are assigned the increasing amount of own revenue such as SNG own taxes and 
fees within its boundaries and (part of) shared taxes in order to match part of growing 
expenditure responsibilities.3 Figure 1 shows their relationship in a graphical representation. 
3 There has been a lack of consistency among researchers and articles concerning how to deal with shared taxes 
in terms of their inclusion in SNG own revenue, which means that it is difficult to have standardized data 
(Anderson, 2010). As late as in 1997, the Working Party on Tax Policy Analysis and Tax Statistics of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs divided tax autonomy into five categories from full discretion over tax rates and 
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The horizontal dimension essentially break the total public revenue (GG revenue) into SNG 
own revenue (r), transfer from CG to SNG (R-r), and CG revenue (1-R).4  
The vertical dimension consists of SNG or subnationally-administered expenditure 
(e), centrally-administered local expenditure (E-e), and CG own expenditure (1-E). The 
distinction between subnationally-administered and centrally administered expenditure is not 
concerned with the funding source for the expenditure. In other words, whether the 
expenditure is funded by SNG own revenue or grants is irrelevant for this categorization. In 
case of a co-financed project, we look to who finally pay for it. The portion of the total 
project costs paid directly from the central budget to project contractors or recipients is 
considered as centrally-administered local expenditure, whereas the share paid by the 
subnational government is seen as SNG or subnationally-administered expenditure regardless 
of whether it is funded by its own revenue or transferred grants from the central government.  
All the variables (r, R, e, E) are expressed as their shares in the GG revenue and 
expenditure, respectively.5 In other words, they are revenue ratio and expenditure ratio in 
terms of the GG total revenue and expenditure. It means that it suffices to know only two out 
of three components of the GG total revenue in order to have a complete picture of the 
revenue sources for SNG and CG; similarly, any two of three expenditure ratios tell us 
exactly the other one. SNG own revenue (r) is widely utilized to represent the degree of 
revenue decentralization while SNG expenditure (e) is the conventional indicator of 
bases to no discretion at all over any tax variable. One of the five categories is tax sharing arrangements, which 
are categorized to its four different subgroups in terms of the level of taxing power (OECD 1999). Stegarescu 
(2005) defines a more detailed notion of revenue decentralization which excludes part of shared tax revenue in 
his calculation of SNG own revenue, while many others utilize the conventional indicator of revenue 
decentralization where all the shared tax revenues are included in SNG own revenue regardless of their degree 
of tax autonomy or taxing power.  
4 According to OECD (1999), the definition of SNG own revenue is the sum of SNG own tax revenue, shared 
tax revenue and non-tax and capital revenue. Each government’s revenue is defined as its total revenue minus 
the intergovernmental transfer revenue of that government level. 
5 In order to focus only on governments’ expenditure responsibilities and corresponding financial means of 
financing that could reasonably be decentralized according to the theory of fiscal federalism, social security has 
been removed from the general government sector. 
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expenditure decentralization.6 True, it is well known that the expenditure shares derived from 
budgetary data is imperfect indicator of expenditure decentralization because it fails to reflect 
SNG’s discretion over its spending. For instance, expenditure mandated by the central 
government or spent on behalf of the central government is regarded as SNG or 
subnationally-administered expenditure in our framework. However, given that we 
differentiate between revenue and expenditure sides of fiscal decentralization, the power of 
administration can be measured as the own expenditures of a given government net of grants 
provided to other governments. The responsibility for service delivery is one thing while the 
composition of specific financial means matching the responsibility is another thing.    
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Feld and Schnellenbach (2008) show that the expenditure share of subnational governments or closely related 
measures is used as the fiscal decentralization variable in about 35% of models, the revenue share is used in 
about 10% of models, and the weighted average of expenditure and revenue decentralization is used in about 3% 
of models in their survey of 26 empirical studies on the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. 
Others are the divergence between central and subnational government spending or revenue (about 12%), and 
the tax autonomy of subnational governments (about 25%). 
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Figure 1: Major components of GG revenue and expenditure 
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It can be easily verified that any measure of fiscal relations including fiscal 
decentralization can be expressed in terms of these break-down of public finances. For 
example, one of the most popular measures of fiscal decentralization measure is SNG own 
revenue and expenditure shares in GG revenue and expenditure, that is, r and e; one of the 
definitions for vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) is the share of transfer to SNG in SNG total 
revenue, which translates to (R-r)/R; one of revenue autonomy indicators is the share of SNG 
own revenue in SNG total revenue, which is simply r/R in this space. Reviewing the relevant 
literature, we transform the typical definition of various fiscal relation measures into a 
functional form in our space, which means they are decomposed into the four elements, that 
is r, e, R, and/or E. Table 1 provide the representation of various fiscal relation measures in a 
functional form on the two-dimensional space. It should be noted that they are categorized 
into fiscal decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance measure since fiscal relations are 
concerned mainly with intergovernmental fiscal interaction revolving around taxing power, 
transfer and spending responsibilities, which means that tax autonomy is not covered by this 
representation.7 In addition, each group is divided to the uncombined and composite 
measures according to whether a measure reflects both sides of revenue and expenditure. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
7 The degree of tax autonomy of subnational governments accounting for autonomous own taxes is derived 
either by using a qualitative scale for the different tax categories which are presented by OECD (1999) 
reflecting the deceasing extent of discretion, or simply by summing the different taxes that only accrue to and 
controlled by subnational governments as the corresponding shares in their total revenues. 
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  Focusing on fiscal decentralization composite measures, we need an objective 
criterion in order to compare and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of these several 
Table 1. Representation of Various Fiscal Relation Measures  
 
Measure Definition Functional Form  Application 
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Revenue 
Decentralization 
Indicator 
(RDI) 
𝑆𝑁𝐺 𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝐺 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑒  Dr(r)=r 
Eyraud and 
Lusinyan 
(2011), 
Escolano et al. 
(2012) 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
Indicator 
(EDI) 
𝑆𝑁𝐺 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒
𝐺𝐺 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  De(e)=e 
Eyraud and 
Lusinyan 
(2011), 
Escolano et al. 
(2012) 
Revenue 
Autonomy I 
(RAI) 
𝑆𝑁𝐺 𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑒
𝑆𝑁𝐺 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑒  𝐴𝐼(𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃) = 𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃 Stegarescu (2005) 
C
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e 
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r 
Revenue 
Autonomy II 
(RAII) 
𝑆𝑁𝐺 𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑒
𝑆𝑁𝐺 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒  𝐴𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒;𝐷�) = 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 1𝐷� Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 
(2009) 
Production-
Revenue 
Indicator (PRI) 
Arithmetic mean of 
RDI and EDI 𝑁(𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒) = 𝑟𝑟 + 𝑒𝑒2  Akai and Sakata (2002)* 
Fiscal 
Decentralization 
Index (FDI) 
Geometric mean of 
fiscal autonomy and 
fiscal importance 
𝑉(𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒;𝐷�) = �𝑟𝑟
𝑒𝑒
× 𝑒𝑒 1
𝐷�
�
1
2
≡ �𝑟𝑟
1
𝐷�
�
1
2
 
Vo (2008)* 
Composite  
Ratio 
(CR)  
𝑃𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑃1 − 𝐸𝐷𝑃𝑃 𝐶(𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒) = 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑒𝑒 Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 
(2009)* 
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I≡TDI 𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟
𝐺𝐺 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝐼(𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃) = 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑟𝑟 Rao and Singh (2002) 
VFIII≡TDII 
𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟
𝐺𝐺 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃;𝐷�) = (𝑃𝑃 − 𝑟𝑟) 1𝐷� Rao and Singh (2002) 
VFIIII≡TDIII 𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟
𝐶𝐺 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃) = 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑟𝑟1 − 𝑟𝑟  Bahl and Wallace (2007) 
VFIIV≡TDIV 𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟
𝑆𝑁𝐺 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝐼𝑉(𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃) = 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃  Rodden (2002), Baskaran (2010) 
VFIV≡TDV 
𝑇𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟
𝑆𝑁𝐺 𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑇𝑉(𝑟𝑟,𝑃𝑃;𝐷�) = 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 1𝐷� Jin and Zou (2002), Eyraud and 
Lusinyan (2011) 
C
om
 
po
si
te
 
VFIVI≡TDVI 
(SNG expenditure -
SNG own revenue)/ 
GG revenue 
𝑇𝑉𝐼(𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒;𝐷�)        = (𝑒𝑒𝐷� − 𝑟𝑟) Bird and Tarasov (2004) 
Note: The asterisk (*) indicates the original source of its fiscal decentralization index. 𝐷� is GG fiscal 
deficit defined as GG expenditure divided by GG revenue. 
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indicators. We propose a pair of criteria as shown below in Definition 1 and 2: impact-
symmetry and VFI-weightedness.  
 
Definition 1: Suppose that a composite indicator for fiscal decentralization F(r,e) is 
increasing, continuous, and differentiable in both arguments. Given the composite indicator 
for fiscal decentralization F(r,e), we define the following concepts: 
(i) F(r,e) is impact symmetric if Fr(r,e) and Fe(r,e) are functionally symmetric. 
(ii) F(r,e) is impact asymmetric if Fr(r,e) and Fe(r,e) are not functionally symmetric. 
where Fr(r,e) is the partial derivative w.r.t. r and Fe(r,e) is the partial derivative w.r.t. e. 
 
Definition 1 delineates the condition that must be met for a composite measure to weigh 
equally between the changes in revenue and expenditure decentralization. When a measure is 
functionally symmetric in its partial derivative function, incremental expenditure 
decentralization raises the composite measure at the same speed or to the same degree as 
incremental revenue decentralization. The impact-symmetry allows us to evaluate the 
previous composite indicators for fiscal decentralization in terms of this relative importance. 
 
Proposition 1: RAII, FDI, and CR are an impact asymmetric measure of fiscal 
decentralization, while PRI is an impact symmetric one. 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
Proposition 1 shows that three of the four previous composite indicators are weighted in favor 
of or against revenue decentralization. It is not surprising that PRI has equal weight on r and 
e because the functional form is the arithmetic mean of the two decentralization measures. 
RAII is decreasing in expenditure decentralization (e), but it can sometimes increase when e is 
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rising. Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) delineates the condition where more 
expenditure decentralization translates to higher RAII. It is an increasing function of 
expenditure decentralization only when the elasticity of revenue decentralization with respect 
to expenditure decentralization is greater than 1. In other words, when revenue 
decentralization comes hand in hand with expenditure decentralization, it is possible to raise 
the level of RAII. It is an obvious statement since the measure r/e can increase only when the 
numerator grows faster than the denominator.  
 While Vo (2008) presents a composite measure called FDI, which can be 
decomposed to the revenue decentralization (denoted by fiscal autonomy) and the SNG share 
of the public expenditure (denoted by fiscal importance), it turns out that a cancellation of the 
expenditure component results in a measure essentially equivalent to the revenue 
decentralization indicator (r) times GG fiscal balance. Thus, the increase in expenditure 
decentralization has no impact on the value of the composite index.  
 More recently, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) propose a new composite 
measure called Composite Ratio, which combines the information captured by both the 
revenue and expenditure decentralization. However, it weighs more heavily the former than 
the latter in some case, and vice versa in the other case, which is stated by following Lemma 
1.  
 
Lemma 1: The effect of revenue decentralization on CR measure is greater than that of 
expenditure decentralization only when the sum of the two decentralization measures, that is, 
r+e, is less than 1. 
 Proof: See Appendix I. 
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It means that the increase in revenue decentralization tends to have much greater impact on 
the composite measure when comprehensive fiscal decentralization is at an early stage while 
expenditure decentralization becomes the more important factor in determining the value of 
CR measure at its mature stage in a relative term. 
 The second criterion which the paper proposes is to see how a composite measure 
adjusts for the gap between revenue and expenditure decentralization.  
 
Definition 2: Given the above composite indicator for fiscal decentralization F(r,e), we 
define the following concepts: 
(i) F(r,e) is VFI-favorable if its second-order cross partial derivative is negative.  
(ii) F(r,e) is VFI-neutral if its second-order cross partial derivative is zero.  
(iii) F(r,e) is VFI-unfavorable if its second-order cross partial derivative is positive. 
where the second-order cross partial derivative of the function F(r,e) is 𝜕
2𝐹(𝑟,𝑒)
𝜕𝑟𝜕𝑒
. 
 
The concept of VFI-favorableness is analogous with that of substitutability, while the 
meaning of VFI-unfavorableness is similar to that of complementarity. Note that in a cardinal 
von Neumann-Morgenstern context it is used to classify goods into substitutes and 
complements. In the first case of a negative cross-partial, one can think of revenue and 
expenditure decentralization as more than substitutes. A composite indicator could increase 
even more by decreasing the correlation between the two indicators. In the latter case of a 
positive cross-partial derivative, indicators are complements, and therefore a composite 
indicator could increase by increasing the correlation between them. In other words, the sign 
on the cross partial derivative of a composite indicator determines whether expenditure 
10 
 
decentralization is a complement or substitute for revenue decentralization in determining the 
level of the composite indicator.  
With the help of this criterion, we can evaluate and compare the composite indicators 
in the previous literature in terms of their weights on VFI.  
 
Proposition 2: RAII is VFI-favorable; CR is VFI-unfavorable; and FDI and PRI is VFI-
neutral, respectively. 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that a composite measure reflects the relative level of revenue and 
expenditure decentralization as well as their absolute degrees in one or another way. The 
larger a gap between revenue and expenditure decentralization, the higher RAII is, whereas 
exactly the opposite holds for the case of CR. In other words, RAII considers any increase in 
either revenue or expenditure decentralization as improvement for fiscal decentralization no 
matter which side of fiscal decentralization is increasing, while CR is designed to impose a 
kind of penalty against the fiscal imbalance. FDI and PRI take the level of the vertical fiscal 
imbalance into no account, which means that these indicators regard revenue and expenditure 
decentralization as perfect substitutes. In short, the bigger the gap between revenue 
decentralization (r) and expenditure decentralization (e) is, the greater the impact of 
incremental expenditure decentralization on a VFI-favorable measure, and vice versa for a 
VFI-unfavorable measure.  
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III. Impact-Symmetric and VFI-weighted Decentralization Indicators 
 
 Given that there is no single indicator that is both impact-symmetric and VFI-
weighted, Section III attempts to develop a new composite indicator which has the two 
properties at the same time. 
 
Definition 3: This paper develops two new composite indicators defined as follows: 
 (i) 𝐒𝐅 = 𝑺𝒇(𝒓, 𝒆) = �𝒓𝟐+𝒆𝟐�𝟏𝟐
√𝟐
  
(ii) 𝐒𝐔 = 𝑺𝒖(𝒓, 𝒆) = 𝟏 − �(𝟏−𝒓)𝟐+(𝟏−𝒆)𝟐�𝟏𝟐
√𝟐
 
 
The two new measures can be depicted on the (r,e) space as in Figure 2. SF and SU are built 
on the distance from origin and (1,1), respectively. The way these new indicators form is 
based on a simple logic that the farther a pair (r*, e*) is located from the origin, the higher 
value they should translate into in the single numerical expression of fiscal decentralization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑟𝑟 ∗ 
𝑒𝑒 ∗ 
1 0 
1 
 
SF 
SU 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
Figure 2: Graphical representation of the new composite indicators in contour 
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According to Definition 1, we evaluate the new measures in order to see whether 
they are impact symmetric or not. 
 
Proposition 3: Both of the new composite indicators, i.e., SF and SU are a impact symmetric 
measure. 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
The functional form of the partial derivatives with respect to r and e is exactly the same in 
both measures. Both indicators are balanced in terms of relative importance between revenue 
and expenditure decentralization.  
 As with the previous indicators, we also examine how the composite indicators 
reflect the widening vertical fiscal imbalance according to Definition 2. 
 
Proposition 4: SF is VFI-favorable whereas SU is a VFI-unfavorable measure. 
Proof: See Appendix I. 
 
Each of the new indicators reflects the opposite point of view on vertical fiscal imbalance. SF 
appreciates the growing gap between revenue and expenditure decentralization. Not 
surprisingly, we find that the different indicators have markedly different results from the gap. 
Suppose a country where r is 0.40 and e is 0.40. Its VFI-neutral PRI indicator is the 
arithmetic mean of r and e, that is, 0.40; and SF and SU are also 0.40. Now suppose that the 
country has devolved as more responsibility for public expenditure to the lower level 
government so that r is still 0.40 but e is raised all the way to 0.80. Its PRI increases to 0.60; 
SF jumps to 0.63; but SU goes up only to 0.55.      
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 Table 2 presents the taxonomy for comparing the previous and new indicators. We 
categorize the composite indicators according to our two criteria in the table. Given that in 
the previous literature we have no indicator which is both impact-symmetric and VFI-
weighted, the two composite indicators that this paper proposes can fill the blank. It is easily 
known that each composite indicator occupies a distinct position in the table, which means 
that it has already made a value judgment about which side of public finance is the more 
important and whether a widening VFI is seen as the process of fiscal decentralization or not.  
 
Table 2. Taxonomy for Composite Indicators of Fiscal Decentralization 
 
 
Relative Contribution of Revenue and Expenditure 
Decentralization 
Symmetric Impact Asymmetric Impact 
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VFI- 
neutral · PRI = 𝑁(𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒) = 𝑟+𝑒2  · FDI = 𝑉(𝑟𝑟;𝐷�) ≡ �𝑟𝑟 1𝐷��12 
VFI-
unfavorable 
· 𝐒𝐔 = 𝑺𝒖(𝒓,𝒆)         = 𝟏 − �(𝟏 − 𝒓)𝟐 + (𝟏 − 𝒆)𝟐�𝟏𝟐
√𝟐
 
· CR = 𝐶(𝑟𝑟, 𝑒𝑒) = 𝑟
1−𝑒
 
 
 In addition, Appendix II presents the 3D graph and contour line of each composite 
indicator predicated on r and e in order to help figure out what makes the difference between 
the composite measures. A follow-up research project is underway to explore patterns and 
changes over time of the historical trends of the composite indicators for cross sections of 
countries. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
So far, this paper proposes the two criteria of impact-symmetry and VFI-
favorableness by which varying composite indicators for fiscal decentralization can be judged 
and compared, and it also comes up with two new composite indicators in order to overcome 
the shortcomings of the previous measures. Now that we come to conclusion that a composite 
indicator always involves a certain viewpoint of the relative importance of revenue and 
expenditure decentralization and a distinct evaluation of vertical fiscal imbalance in an 
implicit or explicit way, a fundamental question could be raised: which is the best single 
indicator? It is not easy to answer, but there may be little rational reason for choosing an 
impact asymmetric indicator. Given that the rigorous meaning of fiscal decentralization 
consists of the equally-important two sub-concepts, the impact symmetric measures are 
recommended to reflect both sides of public finance. 
Concerning VFI-favorableness criterion, VFI is a result of inappropriate assignments 
of tax-raising authority, which is seen as a structural problem. However, the revenue-
expenditure imbalance between the two levels of a government does not always clearly 
indicate the extent to which the revenue-raising powers should be matched to spending 
responsibilities and the extent to which a restructuring of intergovernmental transfers is 
required (Sharma, 2011). Intergovernmental transfers turn out to be indispensable policy 
instruments for stabilizing macroeconomic variables, harmonizing taxes across the nation, 
internalizing fiscal externalities, supplying national minimum level of public goods through 
redistribution, utilizing inter-regional insurance, and exploiting the economies of scale for 
public service delivery. In the real world, some degree of revenue-expenditure imbalance 
along with a well-designed transfer system is inevitable. Thus, the optimal VFI is typically 
15 
 
positive; the question to be addressed is how much positive VFI is optimal. Theoretically, if 
we know the optimal level of transfers, then it is recommended that one rely on VFI-
favorable measures when the current level of revenue-expenditure imbalance is lower than 
the optimal one, whereas she should depend on VFI-unfavorable indicators when the current 
level is higher than the optimal level of VFI. In practice, the task of finding the optimal 
distribution of taxing and spending authority is a political one. Thus the best answer to the 
fundamental question concerning VFI-favorableness might be that it depends on to whom 
you talk. Even so, there has been vast literature insisting that SNG should finance their 
spending with their revenues due to a number of incentive problems with the transfer system 
(Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2011). Having said that, we suggest that one should rely on VFI-
unfavorable measures unless there are reasonable grounds for substituting a VFI-favorable 
indicator for them.  
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 Appendix I 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: Differentiate each composite indicator w.r.t. r and e and compare the 
partial derivatives, respectively.  
 1) ∂A
𝐼𝐼𝐼
∂r
= 𝑟
𝑒
1
𝐷�
 ≠ ∂A
𝐼𝐼𝐼
∂e
= 𝑟
𝑒2
1
𝐷�
 thus RAII is an impact asymmetric indicator. 
 2) ∂V
∂r
= 1
2
(𝑟
𝐷�
)−12 1
𝐷�
 ≠ ∂V
∂e
= 0 thus FDI is an impact asymmetric indicator. 
 3) ∂C
∂r
= 1
1−𝑒
 ≠ ∂C
∂e
= 𝑟(1−𝑒)2 thus CR is an impact asymmetric indicator.  
 4) Since ∂N
∂r
= 1
2
 and ∂N
∂e
= 1
2
 is identical, PRI is an impact symmetric indicator. The 
impact-symmetry is defined by Definition 1. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider the first partial derivative of CR measure as in the proof of 
Proposition 1. The ratio between the two partial derivatives, 𝐶𝑅1
𝐶𝑅2
= 1−𝑒
𝑟
 determines the 
relative effect on CR of the two decentralization indicators. The impact of revenue 
decentralization on CR is greater than that of expenditure decentralization only when 1-e is 
greater than r. In other words, CR1 > CR2 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑟𝑟 + 𝑒𝑒 < 1. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Differentiate each measure twice w.r.t. r and e, respectively, to get 
the second-order cross partial derivative. 
 1) ∂
2𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐼
∂r∂e
= − 𝑟
𝑒2
1
𝐷�
< 0 thus RAII is a VFI-favorable measure by Definition 2. 
 2) ∂
2V
∂r ∂e
= 0 thus FDI is a VFI-neutral measure by Definition 2.  
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 3) ∂
2C
∂r ∂e
= 1(1−𝑒)2 > 0 thus CR is a VFI-unfavorable measure by Definition 2. 
 4) ∂
2N
∂r ∂e
= 0 thus PRI is a VFI-neutral measure by Definition 2. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: Differentiate each composite indicator w.r.t. r and e and compare the 
partial derivatives, respectively. 
 1) Since ∂S
𝑓
∂r
= 𝑟(𝑟2+𝑒2)−12
√2
 and ∂S
𝑓
∂e
= 𝑒(𝑟2+𝑒2)−12
√2
 are functionally symmetric, SF is an impact 
symmetric indicator by Definition 1. 
 2) Since ∂𝑆
𝑢
∂r
= 1
√2
�
1−𝑟[(1−𝑟)2+(1−𝑒)2]12� and ∂𝑆𝑢∂e = 1√2 � 1−𝑒[(1−𝑟)2+(1−𝑒)2]12� are functionally 
symmetric, SU is an impact symmetric indicator by Definition 1. Therefore, all the new 
composite measures are impact symmetric. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: Differentiate the two new composite measures twice w.r.t. r and e, 
respectively, to get the second-order cross partial derivative. 
 1) ∂
2𝑆𝑓
∂r ∂e
= −𝑟𝑒�𝑟2+𝑒2�−32
√2
< 0 thus SF is a VFI-favorable measure by Definition 2. 
 2) ∂
2𝑆𝑢
∂r ∂e
= 1
√2
(1 − 𝑟𝑟)(1 − 𝑒𝑒)[(1 − 𝑟𝑟)2 + (1 − 𝑒𝑒)2]−32 > 0 thus SU is a VFI-unfavorable 
measure by Definition 2. ■ 
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 Appendix II 
 
We draw the 3D graph and contour line of each composite indicator predicated on r and e in 
order to help figure out what makes the difference between the composite measures. The left 
figure represents three-dimensional representation of composite indicators, while the right 
one shows their contour lines. 
 
Figure A.1. Revenue Autonomy II (RAII) 
           
  
Figure A.2. Production-Revenue Indicator (PRI) 
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Figure A.3. Fiscal Decentralization Index (FDI) 
      
 
Figure A.4. Composite Ratio (CR) 
      
 
Figure A.5. Symmetric VFI-favorable (SF) 
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Figure A.6. Symmetric VFI-unfavorable (SU) 
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